Showing posts with label First Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label First Circuit. Show all posts

Friday, December 11, 2015

A Desire To Say “Me Too” Is Not A Basis For Intervention As Of Right

Harvard University proudly proclaims that it considers race in its admissions decisions in order to increase “student body diversity.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (“SFFA”) has a different view of Harvard’s admissions policy and filed a complaint challenging that policy as racially and ethnically discriminatory in violation of both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is, however, one aspect of the litigation on which SFFA and Harvard see eye-to-eye – that a group of current and prospective Harvard students benefitted by Harvard’s current admissions policy (the “Students”) should not be permitted to intervene on behalf of Harvard’s position. The dispute over the Students’ effort to intervene culminated in Wednesday’s decision by the First Circuit in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 15-1823.

The Students filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) and (b) seeking to intervene both as a matter of right and by permission of the court. The District Court denied their motion, but did grant the Students leave to participate in the case as amici curiae. Wanting full party status for themselves, the Students appealed from the District Court’s denial of their motion seeking to intervene as a matter of right.

The First Circuit focused on the District Court’s finding that the Students failed to show that their interests were not adequately represented by an existing party, i.e., Harvard. Although characterizing the Student’s burden on this issue as “minimal,” the First Circuit nevertheless found the Students’ position to be wanting, noting that: (1) the Students and Harvard have the identical goal of defending Harvard’s right to consider race in its admissions decisions; (2) Harvard has plenty of resources with which to litigate; (3) the Students had offered no criticism of Harvard’s choice of counsel (a former U.S. Solicitor General); and (4) Harvard exhibited plenty of incentive to defend the case by going so far as to characterize it as a threat to its “most fundamental values.” To further drive home the point, the Court pointed out that the Students’ stated desire to highlight the effects of Harvard’s legacy policy (admissions preference given to relatives of alumni), which allegedly decreases diversity, would actually hinder, rather than help, Harvard’s defense of the case.

The takeaway: when the best you can do is agree with the arguments of an existing party fully capable of advancing them, you should reconsider filing that intervention motion.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

First Things First – Interlocutory Appeals From Pre-Removal Preliminary Injunctions

The First Circuit has scratched my procedural nerd itch with its decision in Concordia Partners, LLC v. Pick, No. 14-1233, a decision in which the underlying facts are truly irrelevant. Concordia sued Pick in the Maine Superior Court and obtained a preliminary injunction against her in the process. Pick then removed the case to federal court and filed a notice of interlocutory appeal.

As the First Circuit pointed out, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the court’s jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders extends only to “orders of the district court.” Since the order she was appealing from was entered by the Maine Superior Court, Pick relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1450, which provides that “[w]henever any action is removed from a State court to a district court of the United States, … [a]ll injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force an effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” In her view, Section 1450 essentially transformed the Maine Superior Court’s injunction into one issued by the U.S. District Court upon the filing of her notice of removal.

The First Circuit, however, was having none of it. It noted that the text of Section 1450 served only to preserve the status quo in a removed case, rather than to convert a state court order into a federal court order. In order to provide the court with the jurisdictional basis to hear Pick’s interlocutory appeal, the Court concluded, the District Court would have had to have entered an order re-affirming, enforcing, dissolving, or modifying the state court injunction – only then would the Court have been presented with an interlocutory order of a federal district court.

In short, when confronted with a state court preliminary injunction issued prior to removal, move the federal court to take some action of its own with respect to that injunction before filing your interlocutory appeal.

Monday, June 8, 2015

Forewarned Is Forearmed – The First Circuit Has No Patience For Sandbagging

Today’s installment comes to us courtesy of the First Circuit. Last week, the court issued its decision in Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., No. 14-1618. The case itself is an action seeking statutory damages of $500 (to be trebled, of course) for the sending of an unsolicited fax advertisement in May of 2006 in violation of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. I confess that I had no idea that: (a) Congress had created such a federal cause of action; or (b) anyone was really making much use of fax machines in 2006. What caught my attention about this case is that the opinion centers on one of the scourges of litigation practice – the practice by some lawyers of saving arguments for their reply briefs.

In Sparkle Hill, the plaintiff did not respond to the statute of limitations defense raised by the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The District Court took the plaintiff’s failure to respond as a concession, and entered summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, though not without also addressing the merits of the summary judgment defense.

On appeal, the plaintiff’s opening brief was devoted exclusively to the merits of the statute of limitations defense. The plaintiff did not address the District Court’s decision to hold it accountable for its lack of opposition to the defendant’s limitations defense – the actual, procedural basis for the ruling below – until its reply brief, when the defendant would not have an opportunity to respond.

Suffice it to say, the First Circuit was not impressed. After noting the court’s clear precedent that issues raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief are deemed waived, Judge Kayatta offered the following refreshingly blunt assessment: “Sandbagging of this type deprives the appellee of an opportunity to respond in writing on the issue. And any attempt to remedy that unfairness by allowing a second opposition, or sur-reply, brief can both increase costs for the appellee and result in considerable delay.” Amen, Judge.

The First Circuit clearly has no patience for sandbagging, and in Sparkle Hill basically told the Bar to “knock it off.” Ignore the lesson at your peril.